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THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY – THE 
BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
WITH MENTAL HEALTH DISABILITIES
Summary:   The paper analyses Art. 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and its implications for the position of persons with mental 
disabilities. The new concept of legal capacity contained in Art. 12 should ensure 
that fundamental human rights of these persons are no longer “a dead letter on 
paper”. However, once the Convention came into force, the implementation of this 
provision has proved to be problematic for States Parties. Diane Kingston, former 
Vice-Chairperson of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
best expressed the scale of the problem in October 2015 when she emphasized 
that no country had until that point fully met the requirements contained in Art. 
12. Given that the Convention is a document that prescribes the fundamental 
human rights, the statement that no national legislation is consistent with its key 
provision is confusing and worrying. Therefore, a special attention should be paid 
to Art. 12 and its implementation in practice.
Keywords:   CRPD, persons with mental disabilities, human rights, legal capacity, mental 
capacity, supported decision making
1.  INTRODUCTION
Respect for human dignity, personal autonomy, independence, equality, and non-discrim-
ination is the fundamental human right guaranteed without exception to everyone in a range 
of international documents. These are rights that are universal and generally accepted, and are 
not put into question. But, in spite of this, reality has shown that persons with mental disa-
bilities cannot always achieve the full extent of those rights. Numerous researches, as well as 
the practice of the European Court of Human Rights have confirmed that there is still a great 
gap between the prescribed rights of persons with mental disabilities and their implementa-
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tion in practice and that these persons have been, to a greater or lesser extent, marginalized, 
neglected, threatened, and abused in many countries.1 There are many causes of such a condi-
tion, but it has been shown that the source of the majority of problems, which persons with 
mental disabilities face, is their being restricted or denied the legal capacity. Without the legal 
capacity, a large array of rights, which they are guaranteed, remains “a dead letter on paper”.
In most legal systems, legal capacity is acquired from the age of eighteen when an individ-
ual legally assume control over his or her actions. From that moment on he or she can inde-
pendently make important decisions about their life, such as where or with whom to live or 
work. The demands for autonomy and independence are inherent to every man and the ability 
to realize them plays an important role in building self-confidence and self-esteem. These are 
also traits whose development is encouraged from early childhood, but it has been shown that 
different rules apply to persons with mental (or psychosocial) disabilities. Such persons have 
always been exposed to a large number of prejudices that determine the attitude of society 
towards them as persons unable to live independently and who, in turn, are dependent on 
someone else’s provision of care. This practice had its basis also in legal norms. Namely, almost 
all national legislations prescribe that, under certain conditions, persons with mental health 
disabilities may be denied their legal capacity.2 By losing legal capacity, the person also loses a 
wide range of rights; their decisions no longer have legal significance and they become depend-
ent on a guardian who takes full control of their life.3
Although the institute of guardianship has been introduced primarily to protect persons 
with restricted or denied legal capacity, there are many examples of breaching the law and un-
ethical procedures that have compromised it. Instead of protecting the rights of these persons, 
guardianship has often been a cover for their exploitation. Namely, a series of researches, as well 
as practice of the European Court of Human Rights4 points to numerous abuses of the institute 
of guardianship and the violation of fundamental human rights of persons under guardianship.5
The creators of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities6 have recognized 
that legal capacity lies at the heart of all individual freedoms,7 or as Quinn said: “Legal capacity 
1  See M. S. v. Croatia n. 2, (2015), Bureš v. Chech Republic, (2012), Filip v. Romania, (2006), Winterwerp v. Netherlands, (1979) etc.
2  Persons with mental health disabilities can be fully or partially deprived of their legal capacity in all but two EU Member States. 
See Legal capacity of persons with intellectual disabilities and persons with mental health problems, European Union agency for 
fundamental rights, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013, p. 31. URL=https://fra.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/legal-capacity-intellectual-disabilities-mental-health-problems.pdf. Accessed 8 May 2019.
3  Throughout history legal capacity was denied to many groups (including women) based on perceived characteristics of inferiority, but 
it seems that today persons with cognitive disabilities are the only group to which it can be denied. Flynn, E.; Arstein-Kerslake, A., The 
Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2014, pp. 124–125.
4  Lashin v. Russia, (2013), Stanev v. Bulgaria (2012), X and Y v. Croatia, (2011), Shtukaturov v. Russia, (2008) etc.
5  “Guardianship has been overused and abused in the medical, as well as other, contexts, including at the most extreme level to place 
persons with intellectual disabilities in psychiatric institutions. This is inappropriate medically and socially and is inconsistent with the 
rights of persons with intellectual disabilities to health, autonomy, participation, non-discrimination and social inclusion”. Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
Hunt, P., Report to the Sixty-first session of the Commission on Human Rights, 11 Feb. 2005, E/CN.4/2005/51, § 79.
6  Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was adopted on 13 December 2006 and entered into force on 3 May 2008 
[hereinafter CRPD]. The CRPD was signed by 81 countries and the European Union on the very first day since it was available for 
signing. Initial enthusiasm continued, and so far, the Convention has been ratified by 179 countries. 
7  A significant background factor in the emphasis on legal capacity in the CRPD is the widespread abuse of the rights of persons 
with disabilities, which leads to their “civil death”, i.e., losing almost all civil rights. Szmukler, G., “Capacity”, “best interests”, “will 
and preferences” and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, World Psychiatry, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2019, pp. 34–35.
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to me is a continuum that connects with everything needed to enable the person to flousish 
[sic] – a right to make decisions and have them respected, a place of one’s own, a life in the 
community connected to friends, acquaintances and social capital, whether in public or pri-
vate settings. Personhood is broader than just capacity – and these broader connections serve 
to augment capacity in a virtuous circle”.8 
In Art. 12 the creators prescribed a new concept of legal capacity that should enable per-
sons with mental disabilities to finally gain the opportunity to realize their potential and be 
recognized as equal members of society.9 Unlike all earlier human rights documents which, 
though envisaged also as a framework for the protection of persons with mental disabilities, in 
principle started off from the fact that these persons are incapable of exercising certain rights 
and therefore gave others broad discretion to enforce their will, in Art. 12 the CRPD insists on 
the respect for their autonomy and right to self-determination.10 This provision is not only a 
step forward with regards to the existing regulation on the issue, but is the most revolutionary 
among the new norms articulated in CRPD,11 which is considered the beating heart of the Con-
vention.12 Therefore, it is not surprising that its implementation is marked as a special priority 
and that the harmonization of national legislation with the content of Art. 12 is regarded as 
crucial to the realization of all other rights guaranteed by the CRPD.13 Upon its entry into force 
in 2008, the CRPD created tremendous expectations but at the same time it also raised the 
first questions related to the interpretation of Art. 12.14 As Diane Kingston said in October 
2015, the main problem regarding Art. 12 is its applicability in practice.15
The primary aim of this paper is to emphasize the enormous importance and series of 
positive aspects of Art. 12, for people with mental disabilities and their right to autonomy, 
but also to point the potentially negative implications that can emerge as a result from the 
8  Quinn, G., Rethinking Personhood: New Directions in Legal Capacity Law & Policy or How to Put the “Shift” back into “Paradigm Shift”, 
in: Janjic, B.; Beker, K.; Marković, M. (eds.), Legal capacity and community living: protection of the rights of persons with 
disabilities, Mental Disability Rights Initiative MDRI-S, Belgrade, 2014, pp. 17–39, p. 18. 
9  In order to better understand the significance of the CRPD for persons with mental disabilities and particularly its Art. 12, it is 
important to become familiar with the fundamental specificities of the historical development of the legal and real position of 
these persons. For more see Degener, T.; Begg, A., From Invisible Citizens to Agents of Change: A Short History of the Struggle for 
the Recognition of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities at the United Nations, in: Della Fina, V.; Cera, R.; Palmisano, G., (eds.), The 
United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: A Commentary, Springer, 2017, pp. 1–39.
10  Several structural features have been added to the text of the CRPD, which should enable a wider implementation of the CRPD 
than other human rights documents. Lewis, O., The Expressive, Educational and Proactive Roles of Human Rights: An Analysis of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in: McSherry, B.; Weller, P. (eds.), Rethinking rights-based 
mental health laws, Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2010,  p. 113. 
11  Minkowitz, T., The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the right to be free from non-consensual 
psychiatric interventions, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2007, p. 408.
12  Nilsson, A., Who gets to decide? Right to legal capacity for persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities, Council of Europe: 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2012, p. 14. URL= https://rm.coe.int/16806 da5c0. Accessed 8 May 2019.
13  Dhanda, A., Universal legal capacity as a universal human right, in: Dudley, M.; Silove, D.; Gale, F. (eds.), Mental health and human 
rights: vision, praxis, and courage, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 181. 
14  Art 12. is one of the most interesting, most controversial and most important provisions of the CRPD given its application to 
persons with mental disabilities. Korać Graovac, A.; Čulo, A., Konvencija o pravima osoba s invaliditetom – novi pristup shvaćanju 
prava osoba s duševnim smetnjama, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2011, p. 73.
15  Izvješće o radu Pravobraniteljice za osobe s invaliditetom za 2015, pp. 19–20. URL=http://posi.hr/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
IZVJESCE-O-RADU-UREDA-PRAVOBRANITELJICE-ZA-OSOBE-S-INVALIDI TETOM-ZA-2015.pdf. Accessed 8 May 2019.
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insistence on its radical interpretation.16 In the conclusion, it will be attempted to provide 
an answer to the question whether the CRPD creators could have done their job better, i.e., if 
they could have written more clearly one of the most important provisions of the CRPD, thus 
avoiding any controversies arising from its interpretation today. It is also possible that they 
have done their best given the current circumstances and by withholding explicit answers to 
some questions, they have made a big step forward in the direction of actually improving the 
position of persons with mental disabilities in society.
2.    ART. 12 – THE BEATING HEART OF THE CONVENTION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Already during the drafting of the CRPD text it was undeniable that the traditional ap-
proach to the interpretation of legal capacity of persons with disabilities had to change,17 but 
opinions varied with regards to the direction in which these changes should go. Thus, there are 
considerable disagreements around the definition of the term legal capacity and the question 
whether persons with disabilities should be restricted or denied legal capacity, or whether 
the model of substitute decision-making could still exist.18 Yet, after a long and heated de-
bate, an agreement was reached and the text of Art. 12 was adopted. However, this did not 
bring an end to the controversies. Namely, in a still predominantly paternalistic society, the 
harmonization of national legislation with the provision of Art. 12 has proven to be (too) 
big of a challenge for States Parties. While analyzing their reports on the implementation of 
the CRPD, the Committee concluded that Member States have failed to understand the exact 
scope of the obligations arising under Art. 12 and have not made significant changes to their 
legislations. This, in turn, encouraged the Committee to create the General Comment no. 1, 
Art. 12: Equality before the Law in 2014, whose purpose was to clarify disputed issues related 
to the content of Art. 12 and to ensure its unique application in Member States.19 However, 
this did not happen; moreover, the controversy over the content of this provision continued 
and some of the Committee’s conclusions have opened up new questions that are discussed in 
more detail in the continuation of this text.
16  Although “disabilities” is not formally defined in the CRPD, it is accepted by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities [hereinafter the Committee] that people with mental disabilities (or “psychosocial disability”) fall under the CRPD. 
The Committee is a body of independent experts monitoring the implementation of the CRPD in States Parties. For more 
on the Committee see Stein, M.; Lord, J., Monitoring the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Innovations, Lost 
Opportunities, and Future Potential, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 12, 2010, pp. 691–700.
17  Compare Bell, S.; McGregor, J.; Wilson, M., The Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons: A Remaining Dilemma for New 
Zealand?, New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2015, p. 295.
18  The CRPD does not provide an explicit answer to the question whether Art. 12 contains a rebuttable or an irrebuttable 
presumption of enjoyment of legal capacity. For this reason, some countries have been reserved in implementing this provision 
during the ratification of the CRPD. For example, Canada interprets Art. 12 in a way that includes rebuttable presumption of 
the existence of legal capacity. However, despite such an attitude, it is interesting to observe that Canada has made reservation, 
due to the belief that its legislations are not harmonized with Art. 12. Caivano, N., Conceptualizing Capacity: Interpreting Canada’s 
Qualified Ratification of Article 12 of the UN Disability Rights Convention, Western Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2014, pp. 
15–18.
19  United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment no 1: Article 12: Equal recognition before 
the law, CRPD/C/GC/1, adopted 11 April 2014 [hereinafter General Comment].
31
Marissabell Škorić, THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY – THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS...
2.1.   MEANING OF THE TERM “LEGAL CAPACITY”
There is no one generally accepted definition of legal capacity; therefore, States define its 
content differently. Some States define legal capacity as legal standing or capacity to hold rights 
and duties; others define it as the legal agency or capacity to exercise rights and duties; and some 
States in definition include both the capacity to have rights and capacity to exercise rights.20
Due to different definitions of the term legal capacity in UN Member States, discussions 
were held during the negotiations on whether the term legal capacity should include legal 
agency or if it should be limited solely to legal standing.21 One of the proposals was to adopt 
a compromise solution according to which an additional note should be inserted in the Art. 
12(2). This note would prescribe that in three of the six official UN languages (Arabic, Chinese 
and Russian) the meaning of legal capacity would refer solely to the legal standing, thereby 
limiting legal capacity only to capacity to have rights.22 However, this proposal jeopardized 
the possibility of achieving the purposes of the CRPD itself and opened up a number of other 
legal questions. Namely, only the concept of legal capacity that includes both legal standing 
and legal agency makes the person a subject of the law and grants them autonomy and inde-
pendence.23 This broader understanding of the term legal capacity is of paramount importance 
for persons with mental disabilities. Namely, their legal standing has never been disputed, but 
their legal agency, i.e. the capacity to make legally relevant decisions, is. Without it, as has 
been noted before, most other rights guaranteed to them cannot be realized. Therefore, enor-
mous efforts of civil society associations to eradicate this note come as no surprise and neither 
do the efforts of certain States which have justifiably insisted on a single interpretation of the 
concept of legal capacity in all States Parties.24 In the end, their efforts have come to fruition 
and the note was deleted from the proposal of the final text of the CRPD.
Disputes arising from the content of this term continued even after the CRPD came into 
force,25 but most authors agree that the term legal capacity referred to in Art. 12 should be 
understood in its widest sense to include capacity for rights and capacity to act.26 This conclu-
20  Caivano, op. cit., note 18, p. 9.
21  The question regarding the definition of legal capacity has been raised before. The Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women made the following conclusion on this issue: “When countries limit a woman’s legal capacity 
by their laws, or permit individuals or institutions to do the same, they are denying women their rights to be equal with men 
and restricting women’s ability to provide for themselves and their dependents.” See U.N. General Assembly, Report of the 
Committee the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, § 8, U.N. A/49/38 (Apr. 12, 1994).
22  For more see Schulze, M., Understanding the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A Handbook on the 
Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Handicap International, 2009, pp. 60–65.
23  Legal standing without legal agency means little. For example, legal standing allows a person to be the owner of a house, but if 
the person does not have legal agency, then he or she cannot conclude a contract that will enable him or her to exercise that right. 
24  This attitude has been adopted by, among others, EU Member States. See Lintonen, Letter dated 5 December 2006 from 
the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman, U. N. General Assembly, A/
AC.265/2006/6 (Dec. 5, 2006).
25  The first official translation of the CRPD into Croatian understood only legal standing under the term legal capacity (The Official 
Gazette, International Treaties, 67/2007), but the subsequent correction included legal agency as well (The Official Gazette, 
International Treaties, 5/2008).
26  See Bartlett, P., The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law, Modern Law Review, 
Vol. 75, No. 5, 2012, p. 764, Callaghan, S.; Ryan, C., An evolving revolution: Evaluating Australia’s compliance with the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Mental Health Law, UNSW Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2016, p. 602, Minkovitz, op. cit., 
note 11, pp. 410–411, Caivano, op. cit., note 18, pp. 8–9.
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sion was confirmed by the Committee, which expressly observed in the General Comment that 
“legal capacity includes the capacity to be both a holder of rights and an actor under the law.”27
2.2.    CAN LEGAL CAPACITY BE RESTRICTED OR DENIED TO A PERSON WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITIES?
Whether or not the possibility of restricting or denying legal capacity should be envisaged 
and some form of guardianship kept was the subject of lengthy discussions during the pro-
cess of creating the CRPD. A part of the delegates considered that some form of guardianship 
should be ensured for those exceptional cases when a person cannot carry out their legal ca-
pacity and they advocated that this issue be regulated in the CRPD. This view is in line with 
the existing practice of most European countries which prescribe in their national legislation 
conditions and procedures for the restriction and denial of legal capacity. In this case, most of 
them accept the so-called functional model of denying legal capacity (functional approach), ac-
cording to which an individual’s absence of cognitive abilities, i.e. his or her inability to under-
stand (comprehend) the nature and consequences of a certain decision (mental capacity) is the 
foundation for the restriction or denial of legal capacity.28 Consequently, the decision-making 
capacity was accepted as a legitimate basis for the legal capacity. Precisely the assessment of 
certain psychological functions of a person is the demarcation line between those decisions 
that have a legal effect and those that do not. Decisions and preferences of persons with men-
tal capacity are respected, while legal capacity is denied and a guardian is appointed to those 
persons who do not have mental capacity.29
On the other hand, a significant number of delegates considered that the system of guard-
ianship and substitute decision-making has throughout history resulted in a lot of injustice 
and has caused unforeseeable adverse consequences for persons with mental disabilities so 
that it is imperative to replace it with new solutions that will be based on respect for the rights, 
will and preferences of the person to which the decision applies.
Although some working drafts of Art. 12 foresaw the guardianship system as the last re-
sort in cases where it is not possible to determine the true will of the person,30 the final text of 
the CRPD does not mention substitute consent. Unlike most national legislations, as well as a 
27  General Comment, op. cit., note 19, § 12.
28  There are three commonly known models of denying legal capacity. In addition to the functional model, there is the so-called 
status approach according to which the existence of a certain form and degree of disability suffices for the denial of legal capacity, 
regardless of the person’s true capacity and, the so-called outcome approach, which is focused on the reasonableness of the 
decision the individual has made on his or her own.
29  Experts agree that the following four aspects should be taken into account when assessing mental capacity: understanding 
information important for decision-making, capacity to evaluate or apply information to one’s own situation, capacity to 
use that information in the decision-making process and the capacity to communicate a clear decision or a consistent choice. 
McSherry, B., Decision-Making, Legal Capacity and Neuroscience: Implications for Mental Health Laws, Laws, Vol. 4, 2015, pp. 128–
129. See Štrkalj Ivezić, S., Procjena kapaciteta za odlučivanje kao ključan faktor u donošenju odluke za lišavanje poslovne sposobnosti, 
in: Poslovna sposobnost i skrbništvo – raskorak između Konvencije o pravima osoba s invaliditetom i prakse, Pravobraniteljica 
za osobe s invaliditetom, Zagreb, 2012, p. 67.
30  See U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities on its seventh session, Annex 2, Art. 12, A/AC.265/2006/2 (Feb. 
13, 2006), Schulze, op. cit., note 22, pp. 60–65. 
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number of other human rights documents that foresee that under exceptional circumstances a 
person with mental disabilities may be denied their legal capacity, the CRPD does not contain 
such a provision.31 From the adopted text of Art. 12 it is clear that it was the intention of the 
Convention’s creators to replace the previous model that has allowed for the removal of legal 
capacity and the appointment of guardians with a new model based on the assumption that 
all persons enjoy legal capacity. The Convention’s creators thereby did not deny that an indi-
vidual may have a particular impairment that could, to a greater or lesser extent, affect their 
decision-making capacity. But at the same time, they made a clear departure from the current 
practice in which, in such cases, a person would be denied their legal capacity and appointed 
a guardian who would make decisions on their behalf. Instead, Art. 12 calls on States Parties 
to provide persons with disabilities with the support they need to exercise their legal capacity 
and it insists that, when providing such support, the rights, will, and preferences of the person 
to whom the support is provided are respected.
The Committee has also addressed this issue. In its view, the principle of equality requires 
the recognition of universal legal capacity of all persons, regardless of their disability or deci-
sion-making skills and the States are obliged to abolish the denial of legal capacity on the basis 
of disability because such practice is discriminatory.32 In the opinion of the Committee, legal 
capacity and mental capacity are two different concepts. Legal capacity comprises the ability 
to hold rights and duties and the ability to exercise those rights and duties and it is the key to 
participating in society. Mental capacity refers to the ability to make decisions and this differs 
from person to person and is the result of a complex interaction of different influences, includ-
ing the environment and social factors. The basic starting point of the Committee is that legal 
capacity must be independent of the decision-making capacity, i.e., that “deficits in mental 
capacity must not be used as justification for denying legal capacity.”33 It is this demand that 
marks a significant departure from the existing contemporary legislations that consider the 
existence of the decision-making capacity crucial to the recognition of legal agency,34 which 
in a number of States is synonymous with legal capacity. A direct consequence of this kind of 
interpretation is that every person has the right to independently make decisions, without the 
interference of others and their capacity to do so must not be questioned. In the opinion of 
the Committee, legal capacity must be separated from the concept of mental capacity, which 
is in and of itself extremely controversial, non-objective and not based on scientific criteria. 
Consequently, the Committee finds the functional approach to denying legal capacity, which 
is accepted in most States, to be unacceptable because it is discriminatory and founded on the 
wrong premise that we are able to accurately analyze the inner-workings of the human mind. 
In this respect, the Committee does not dispute the possibility that a person might be suffer-
ing from a certain type of impairment, but, in its view, this cannot be the basis for the aboli-
tion of legal capacity. The obligation is rather imposed on States Parties to provide the person 
31  Previous documents adopted by the U.N. did not deal with the justification of denying legal capacity. Their attention was focused 
on the establishment of protective mechanisms that would prevent abuses, but they did not question the possibility that certain 
rights would be restricted or denied to persons with mental disabilities. See U.N. General Assembly, Principles for the Protection 
of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, (Dec. 17, 1991) and U.N. General 
Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res 2856 (XXVI), (Dec. 20, 1971). 
32  General Comment, op. cit., note 19, § 25.
33  Ibid. § 13.
34  Callaghan & Ryan, op. cit., note 26, p. 602.
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with the necessary support so that they could realize their legal capacity. It is also important 
to emphasize that the Committee considers that the support given to a person to realize his or 
her legal capacity should not depend on the assessment of mental capacity. In its opinion, it is 
necessary to determine some other grounds to do so that are not as discriminatory as mental 
capacity, but the Committee has not specified what such grounds might be.35
The Committee’s views on this issue are complemented by the conclusion that States must 
replace substitute decision-making with supported decision-making.36 The Committee insists 
on the interpretation of Art. 12 in a manner that calls for a complete abolition of substitute 
decision-making and considers that the States which prescribe both systems, i.e. supported 
and substitute decision-making, do not meet the requirements of Art. 12 of the CRPD. The 
Committee does not deny that persons with mental disabilities occasionally need support in 
carrying out their legal capacity and in that sense the States are obliged to take the appropriate 
measures to ensure this support; however, this support must not grow into substitute deci-
sion-making. In other words, the Committee insists on abolishing the system of guardianship 
and setting up a system of support that will ensure that the will and preferences of the person 
are always and in every case respected. In this regard, the Committee broadly defined support 
by including formal and informal agreements on different degrees of intensity and type of 
support, such as trusted support persons, advocacy, peer support or assistance with commu-
nication.37 If, despite all measures taken, it is still not possible to determine the person’s will 
and preferences, then one should not implement the principle of “best interest” but rather the 
principle of “best interpretation of will and preferences”.38 The Committee therefore did not 
envisage taking into account anything but the will and preferences of the person, and it there-
by makes a clear departure from the use of the functional capability test and the application 
of the principle of “best interest”.
Unlike Art. 12 of the CRPD, which calls for the establishment of a new regime of supported 
decision-making that must be based on the respect for the rights, will, and preferences of the 
person being supported and leaves it up to States Parties to settle the matter in national law 
in accordance with the Convention principles, the General Comment goes one step further. 
Namely, the Committee stated very resolute conclusions on the content of Art. 12 and the 
obligations placed before States Parties that have not been explicitly included in the CRPD, 
so it is not surprising that they are the topic of numerous scientific and expert discussions. 
The main controversy surrounding this issue is whether to accept the wider interpretation of 
the Committee, which does not leave room for restriction of legal capacity based on mental 
capacity, or a narrower interpretation of Art. 12, which requires a departure from substitute 
decision-making to supported decision-making.
35  General Comment, op. cit., note 19, § 14, 15 and 29 (i).
36  Ibid. § 26. 
37  Ibid. § 17 and 28. 
38  The Committee emphasized that “the “will and preferences” paradigm must replace the “best interests” paradigm to ensure that 
persons with disabilities enjoy the right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others.” Ibid.§ 21.
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3.    ART. 12 OF THE CRPD AND GENERAL COMMENT NO 1: OPEN 
QUESTIONS
3.1.    LEGAL CAPACITY VERSUS MENTAL CAPACITY
The term “mental capacity” is not expressly mentioned in the Art. 12, but in the Com-
mittee’s view any reference to decision-making capacity, while issuing a restriction of legal 
capacity, is discriminatory and contrary to the requirements of the CRPD.39 Among the au-
thors who endorsed this interpretation of the Committee is Minkowitz, who considers that: 
“The Committee states that Article 12 calls for universal legal capacity, without discrimination 
based on disability. Removal of disqualifications based on disability moves us towards uni-
versal legal capacity, for two reasons. It means that we are separating “legal capacity” from 
“mental/functional/contractual capacity” and refusing any legal significance to the latter, so 
that legal capacity becomes an interface with the legal system as an actor and subject, free of 
any judgment about the person’s decision-making skill.”40
The principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination, invoked by the Committee and 
authors who support its interpretation, is one of the fundamental principles of the modern sys-
tem of human rights and freedoms, which, due to its significance, is reflected in all fundamental 
human rights documents, including the CRPD. States Parties have undertaken to prohibit any 
discrimination based on disability and to guarantee to persons with disabilities equal and effec-
tive protection against discrimination on all grounds.41 However, despite the general acceptance 
of the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination, there is no consensus either in 
philosophy or the law and not even in the public opinion on what this actually means.42 The es-
sence of anti-discrimination law is contained in the inadmissibility of treating a person or group 
of persons in a different, less acceptable way relative to another person or group of persons in 
similar circumstances. But the question remains how can this formal or legal equality be applied 
in the specific context of disability?43 Different treatment of persons may lead to discrimination, 
but it may also be justified if there is proper reason for such treatment.44 Starting from this 
approach, some authors consider it unacceptable that, in Committee’s view, any reference to 
39  Ibid. § 15.
40  Minkowitz, T., Submission to Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the Draft General Comment on Article 12, 22 
Jan. 2014, URL=https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/GC/WNUSP. doc, Accessed 8 May 2019. Dhanda also 
considers that conditioning the legal capacity with the decision-making capacity privileges a certain group of persons and 
discriminates against another and discusses universal legal capacity as a universal human right. Dhanda contends the CRPD 
in Art. 12 recognizes the universal legal capacity for people with disabilities. Dhanda, A., Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights 
Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future? Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 34, 
2007, pp. 429–460, Dhanda, op. cit., note 13, pp. 177–188.
41  See Art. 5 of the CRPD. For more on equality and non-discrimination see Škorić, M., Utjecaj Konvencije o pravima osoba s 
invaliditetom na kaznenopravni institut neubrojivosti, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Rijeka, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2017, 
pp. 1029–1032.
42  Compare Dworkin, R., Sovereign virtue, the theory and practice of equality, Harvard University Press, 2002.
43  For more on disability equality norms across European countries see Vanhala, L., The Diffusion of Disability Rights in Europe, 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 37, 2015, pp. 839–844.
44  The ECHR has issued a number of judgments containing guidelines for demarcation between acceptable and unacceptable 
different treatment in the sense of Art. 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. See Andrejeva v. Latvia, (2009), Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, (1985).
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psychological impairment in decision-making, which affects the person’s right, is contrary to the 
CRPD. Dawson believes it is important to determine the basis on which people are treated differ-
ently. Without denying certain problems in accurate assessments of internal functioning and the 
state of the human mind, he points out that cognitive impairment can be considered relevant for 
certain decisions and that ignoring problems in a person’s functioning can seriously endanger 
him or her and other persons’ interests. In the opinion of this author, the Committee has given a 
radical interpretation of Art. 12 and he therefore cannot support its conclusion that the concept 
of mental capacity should be completely abandoned when deciding on legal capacity.45 Callaghan 
& Ryan also criticize the interpretation of the Committee, which insists on abandoning the con-
cept of decision-making as part of its legal capacity, while simultaneously failing to provide a 
coherent alternative account of the nature of the right to autonomy and its limits. Insisting on 
the standpoint that being autonomous means that every effort must be made to respect the 
expressed will, without bringing into question the capacity of the person to express it, opens up 
a series of practical and ethical questions to which the Committee has not provided answers. For 
example, what if the expressed will is based on a completely erroneous interpretation of relevant 
facts or on the lack of awareness of the seriousness of consequences that may arise from such 
a pronounced will. Callaghan & Ryan emphasize, as the very core of the problem, that “while 
the autonomy theory in general is concerned with the concept of “agency,” theories of universal 
capacity do not yet agree on the extent to which expressions of “will” and “preference” must also 
involve this characteristic and how it could be discerned.” If we do not pay enough attention to 
the very expression of will and preferences, in practice this can be turned into mere “do what I 
say I want right now.”46 Bartlett also thinks that the mental state may, in certain cases, be im-
portant for the proper response of the society, and that the fact that the psychological condition 
of a person has often been used in past in extremely inappropriate ways, does not necessarily 
mean that it always leads to discrimination.47 According to Bach & Kerzer, the language of Art. 
12 has adopted a wide range of different degrees of capacity, thus presenting a departure from 
the traditional dualistic model: mental capacity versus mental incapacity. In this way, the crea-
tors of the CRPD wanted to avoid problems arising from the system of guardianship, to ensure 
that a person never loses autonomy and also to enable people with disabilities to enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis as everyone else in all aspects of life. These authors have developed 
a model that differentiates between three possible decision-making statuses depending on the 
person’s capacity to express his or her will and understand the nature and consequences of their 
decisions, namely: legally independent status, supported decision-making status and facilitated 
decision-making status. The latter would only be used as the last resort in cases where a person 
has a significant intellectual impairment and it is not possible to determine his or her will and 
preferences and there is no one close to the person who could give us the information about his 
or her wishes. Only in such cases may the principle of “best interest” be applied when making a 
decision.48
45  Dawson, J., A realistic approach to assessing mental health laws’ compliance with the UNCRPD, International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry, Vol. 40, 2015, pp. 70, 73.
46  Callaghan, S.; Ryan, R., Is there a future for involuntary treatment in Right-based Mental Health Law, Psychiatry, Psychology and 
Law, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2014, pp. 748, 755.
47  Bartlett, op. cit., note 26, p. 763.
48  Bach, M.; Kerzner, L., A new paradigm for protecting autonomy and the right to legal capacity, Advancing Substantive Equality for 
Persons with Disabilities through Law, Policy and Practice, Law commission of Ontario, 2010, pp. 6-9, 30, 82-94. URL=https://www.
lco-cdo.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/disabilities-commissioned-paper-bach-kerzner.pdf. Accessed 8 May 2019.
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In the CRPD, very little attention is paid to the meaning of “will” and “preferences” or 
the way in which they are to be respected. On the other hand, the Committee has taken on 
quite a radical stance on these issues, which insists on respecting the expressed will without 
questioning the capacity of the person to express it. Literal and unwavering acceptance of the 
Committee’s opinion that denies any possibility of referring to mental abilities when deciding 
on the legal capacity requires, in essence, abandoning the concept of mental capacity when 
making any decision that may affect the individual’s right. Accepting such interpretation of 
Convention provisions would mean abandoning some of the fundamental principles of all 
modern legal systems. It would require, among other, substantial interventions in criminal 
justice systems of almost all Member States. Namely, in contemporary criminal legislation, 
the perpetrator’s mental health has a direct effect on his or her culpability and persons with 
mental disabilities enjoy separate status in relation to other perpetrators of unlawful acts.49 
Callaghan & Ryan rightly point out that it is unclear, for example, whether the Committee 
believes that any denial of treatment should be taken as an expression of the person’s will and 
whether such a decision should be always respected, regardless of the circumstances. If it had 
been the Committee’s intention to prohibit assistance to a person who, for example, is delir-
ious and expresses opposition to treatment, Callaghan & Ryan conclude that this is a radical 
change that has significant implications which are not limited only to the respect for the right 
to autonomy.50 The Committee does not even allow for the possibility of providing support to 
depend on the person’s mental capacity, but requires some other basis. However, by doing so 
the Committee did not state what this basis might be. 
Without doubting the good intentions of Committee members, this interpretation, which 
some authors rightly deem radical, can ultimately produce a completely opposite effect and 
harm the rights of people with mental disabilities, as well as bring into question the possi-
bility of achieving other CRPD requirements.51 Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a 
significant number of those who disagree with the interpretation provided by the Committee 
and point to the difference between, on the one hand, the mere exclusion of the person on 
the basis of his or her disability and, on the other hand, the denial of the person’s right on the 
basis of his or her inability to perform a particular act. At the same time, it is not questionable 
that the assessment of mental capacity opens up a series of ethical and legal doubts regarding 
the issue of human autonomy and that it is an extremely complicated and complex process 
for which there is no gold standard.52 It is also undisputed that clearer criteria for determin-
ing mental capacity would certainly contribute to a better understanding of this term, but 
49  That refers to both, the countries of the continental legal circle that consider the impact of mental illness on an individual’s 
behavior primarily within the framework of guilt as an element in the dogmatic construction of a criminal offense, as well as 
common law countries, which take into consideration the question of the existence of mental illness, which may lead to the 
exclusion of guilt, within the procedural right to defense (insanity defense). For more see Škorić, op. cit., note 41, pp. 1027–1056.
50  Callaghan; Ryan, op. cit., note 46, p. 755. This problem is also emphasized by Szmukler, G., Submission to Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities on the Draft General Comment on Article 12, 2014. URL= https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/
Pages/DGCArticles12And9.aspx. Accessed 8 May 2019.
51  Majstorović, I.; Šimović, I., Opseg lišenja poslovne sposobnosti kao pretpostavka zaštite prava i dostojanstva osoba s 
invaliditetom, Ljetopis socijalnog rada, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2018, pp. 72–73. Freeman, M. C. et al., Reversing hard won victories in the 
name of human rights: a critique of the General Comment on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Lancet Psychiatry, Vol. 2, No. 9, 2015, p. 844, Szmukler, G., UN CRPD: Equal recognition before the law, Lancet Psychiatry, Vol. 2, 
No. 11, 2015, p. 29. 
52  For more details, see Banner, N.; Szmukler, G., “Radical interpretation” and the Assessment of decision-making capacity, Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2013, pp. 379–382.
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it cannot be claimed that despite the absence of such criteria there is no basis for denying a 
particular person some right based on the inability to perform a particular act.
3.2.    REGIMES OF SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING VERSUS REGIMES OF 
SUBSTITUTE DECISION-MAKING
There are significant differences between the regimes of supported decision-making and 
substitute decision-making. The fundamental difference is that with substitute decision-mak-
ing the consent of the person to whom the decision refers is not required and the final decision 
is made by a guardian who is guided by the principle of “best interest”, while with supported 
decision-making the person to whom it refers makes the decision with the help of others.53 
The common practice has allowed the guardian to make decisions on behalf of the person 
under guardianship based on the principle of “best interest” without taking into account the 
will and preferences of the person to which the decision applies. The CRPD, in turn, insists 
on respecting the rights, will, and preferences of the person being assisted. At the same time, 
the CRPD does not regulate the case when a person has a serious mental impairment and 
despite the provided support he or she cannot express their will and wishes and such persons 
undoubtedly exist. It is therefore important to answer the question whether, in accordance 
with the provisions of the CRPD, a third party, acting in accordance with the principle of “best 
interest”, can make decisions on behalf of another person and, if so, under what conditions?
Bell et al. are of the opinion that substitute decision-making is in some cases inevitable and 
they point out that the Working Group of the Convention was aware of this fact. This conclu-
sion is based on the text of Art. 12(4) due to the fact that it prescribes a series of safeguard 
measures to prevent misuse in supported decision-making.54 The explicit mention of substi-
tute decision-making is considered unnecessary because “the requirements for the provision 
of support proportionate to the person’s needs could encompass the whole range of support 
from highest to lowest.”55 Donnelly also believes that substitute decision-making should be 
preserved for certain limited cases.56 Dowson points out that the text of Art. 12 should be 
interpreted in such a way that, before a decision is made on their legal capacity, the person 
must be provided with adequate support so that he or she can express their will and wishes on 
their own, and measures of reasonable adaptation in their environment should be undertaken 
which will improve their capacity to make a decision. However, if all these measures are not 
sufficient for a person to make a decision on their own, then it is imperative that other persons 
are empowered to make a decision on their behalf. In such exceptional situations, the person 
making the decision is still tied to the “best interpretation” of the concerned person’s will and 
53  For more details on the difference between supported decision-making and substituted decision-making see Caivano, op. cit., 
note 18, pp. 4–5.
54  Art. 12(4) prescribes safeguards that must be present in a process of support-making decision to prevent abuse in accordance 
with international human rights law. It is important that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity are “free of conflict 
of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible 
and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body”.
55  Bell et al., op. cit., note 17, p. 289.
56  Donnelly, M., Best interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time to say goodbye, Medical Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 318–319.
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preferences.57 Minkowitz also states that substitute decision-making is not expressly prohib-
ited in Art. 12 and that a part of the provision from paragraph 4, which refers to measures 
that relate to the exercise of legal capacity may, on its own, be interpreted in such a way as 
to include both supported and substitute decision-making. But Art. 12(4) must not be inter-
preted in a way that presumes the existence of substitute decision-making, but rather, on the 
contrary, must be interpreted in such a way that the rights, will, and preferences of the person 
must always be taken into account.58 Callaghan & Ryan point out that if a person with serious 
impairment is given 100% support to make a decision, one cannot deny that it is quite certain 
that the decision was actually made by the person providing the support. In such a case, it is 
legal fiction that this is about supported decision-making. In reality, this is substitute deci-
sion-making, but there is no supervision that is characteristic of this form of decision-making. 
In the opinion of these authors, insisting solely on supported decision-making will result in 
the fact that required safeguard means in certain cases will exceed those that are usually char-
acteristic of this form of decision-making.59 This places an enormous burden on the system 
of supported decision-making and creates a vague legal nature of the decisions that are being 
made. These authors have pointed out an extremely important issue to be addressed with re-
gards to the establishment of protective mechanisms within the supported decision-making 
system that should prevent misuse and ensure that the final decision is the result of the real 
will and preferences of the person to whom it refers.60 Namely, the introduction of supported 
decision-making system can have unforeseeable adverse consequences for people with mental 
disabilities if the so far constructed protective mechanisms, which are characteristic of the 
substitute decision-making model, are not implemented, further improved and developed. 
It would be very unfortunate if countries were to meet the CRPD requirements by simply re-
placing the names so that what they used to call substitute decision-making has now become 
supported decision-making without providing adequate protection mechanisms. The position 
of the person with mental disabilities would in that case be worse due to the loss of control 
mechanisms associated with substitute decision-making.
It is crucial to note that Art. 12 obliges the States to build a supported decision-making 
system that must be proportionate to the needs of the individual. It should cover a whole 
range of different forms of support, whereby the person providing support should build a 
personal relationship with the person he or she is helping and take the appropriate steps to 
make full use of their potential. Dinerstein defines supported decision-making as: “... a series 
of relationships, practices, arrangements and agreements, of more or less formality and in-
tensity, designed to assist an individual with a disability to make and communicate to others 
decisions about the individual’s life... A purer form of supported decision-making would rely 
on peer support (for example, ex-users of psychiatric services for people with psycho-social 
disabilities), community support networks and personal assistance, so-called natural supports 
57  Dawson, op. cit., note 45, p. 74.
58  Minkowitz, T., Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in: McSherry, 
B.; Weller, P. (eds.), Rethinking rights-based mental health laws, Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2010, pp. 
156–157. 
59  Callaghan; Ryan, op. cit., note 26, p. 607.
60  Callaghan; Ryan, op. cit., note 46, pp. 756–760. Compare Gooding, P., Navigating the “Flashing Amber Lights” of the Right to Legal 
Capacity in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Responding to Major Concerns, Human Rights 
Law Review,  Vol. 15, No. 1, 2015, pp. 55–57. 
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(family, friends), or representatives (pursuant to a representation agreement) to speak with, 
rather than for, the individual with a disability”.61 
Minkowitz also lists different types of support that can be provided to a person (peer sup-
port, community support networks, personal assistance, etc.), as well as support programs 
developed in individual countries. According to her opinion the diverse spectrum of protective 
mechanisms envisaged in Art. 12(4) will be applied differently depending on the type of aid, as 
well as the legal work for which the aid is envisaged.62 
Schulz points out that one of the major challenges during the negotiations has been the 
precise clarification that the level of support and help within the supported decision-making 
system will be smaller or higher and will vary between 0% and 100%.63 However, it is impor-
tant to note that the determination and respect for the true will and preferences of the per-
son being supported are at the very core of supported decision-making and exactly this point 
presents a difference embodying the new paradigm which has been promoted by the CRPD.64 
In other words, we are dealing with supported decision-making also if the degree of support 
amounts to 100%, provided that the final decision is based on the (previously) expressed will 
and preferences of the person. In this way, the regime of supported decision-making can also 
be applied in extreme situations, e.g. when a person is lying in a coma, because even then 
previously expressed wishes, abiding values,  and experience with similar situations can be 
discovered, relying thereby on the support of family, friends, neighbors and all other people 
who can provide help.65 A decision made by a third party in such a case would not be consid-
ered substitute but rather supported until it reflects the previously stated will of the person to 
whom it relates. Schulz further points out that the need for the highest level of support will 
be extremely rare if a good support system has been provided.66 Indeed, an adequate support 
system on which the CRPD insists can greatly facilitate and ultimately empower the person to 
make decisions in the future. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be argued that it will always be possible to determine the will and 
preferences of the person to whom the decision refers. Therefore, it is not entirely possible to 
exclude the possibility that in some cases a third party should make the decision based on the 
principle of “best interest”.67 But, with a well-designed and developed support system, such 
situations should in practice be exceptionally rare.
61  Dinerstein, R., Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The 
Difficult Road From Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, Human rights brief, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2012, p. 10.
62  See Minkowitz, op. cit., note 11, p. 409, Minkowitz, op. cit., note 58, p. 157.
63  Schulze, op. cit., note 22, p. 60.
64  Compare Minkowitz, op. cit., note 58, pp. 157–159.
65  One of the most frequently asked question about Art. 12 was the manner in which its demands should be met in the event that a 
person cannot express his or her will and wishes even with provided support (e.g. person in a coma). See Gooding, supra note 59, 
at 53-55, Del Villar, K., Should supported decision-making replace substituted decision-making? The Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities and Coercive Treatment under Queensland’s Mental Health Act 2000, Laws, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2015, pp. 192–194.
66  Schulze, op. cit., note 22, p. 60.
67  Perhaps, in such cases, consideration might be given to the use of some other term instead of substituted decision-making, 
which would be a clear departure from the previous practice. Thus Bach and Kerzner use the term ‘facilitated decision-making 
status‘ for cases when a person has significant intellectual impairment and it is not possible to determine his or her will and 
preferences and neither is there a person who could help in this endeavor. Bach; Kerzner, op. cit., note 48, pp. 91–94.
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4.  CONCLUSION
Despite the various interpretations of the content of Art. 12, it is undisputed that the legal 
capacity of all persons with disabilities is presumed and that it includes both the capacity for 
rights and the capacity to act. It is also unquestionable that those persons who need support 
to realize their legal capacity must be provided with it and that the rights, will, and preferences 
of the person being supported must be respected. Consequently, the entry into force of the 
CRPD no longer raises the question does a person have the mental capacity to exercise their 
legal capacity but rather what types of support are required for the person to exercise his or 
her legal capacity.68 It is crucial to note that requirements of Art. 12 of the CRPD cannot be 
met without a clear departure from the common practice, which has too lightly reached for the 
institute of guardianship.
At the same time, it cannot be denied that there are persons who, despite the best will and 
the greatest support, cannot make a decision. The CRPD does not provide an explicit answer 
what should be done in such cases and it is perfectly legitimate to raise the question why the 
CRPD is silent on this extremely important issue. Maybe we could answer this question more 
easily if we rearranged it and asked ourselves the following: If the CRPD provided that under 
some exceptional circumstances the legal capacity of persons with disabilities can be denied, 
could any improvement of their real position be expected? Previous experiences clearly show 
that this is not the case! By prescribing such an exception, this Convention would be just 
one more set of human rights documents that would not substantially improve the position 
of people with disabilities. Namely, all previous international documents relating to persons 
with mental disabilities considered that control over these persons was, in certain cases, jus-
tified, while the allowed limit of control was a matter of discussion. The CRPD starts from a 
completely opposite position – stressing that the control of their life belongs exclusively to 
them and placing into the foreground their decision-making capacity and fundamental human 
rights. When recalling the treatment of people with mental disabilities throughout history, 
as well as a number of examples of abuse of their rights, it is quite understandable that re-
spect for their will is one of the fundamental goals of the CRPD, which must be supported 
without reservation. Therefore, the silence of the CRPD on what to do when we are unable to 
determine the will of a person, as well as other important issues, should not be considered its 
shortcoming. On the contrary, this provides States Parties with the freedom to independently 
develop support models in accordance with the objectives and principles set forth in the CRPD 
and to take measures that will enable persons with mental disabilities to become subjects with 
the right to their own choices and exercise autonomous decision-making, instead of them 
being objects of a third party’s decisions. 
The problem of not recognizing the capacity of persons with mental disabilities is deeply 
rooted in our society and, above all, we have to ask ourselves, both as lawyers, doctors, mem-
bers of the family of persons with mental disabilities, and as citizens, if we are truly ready to 
hear and respect the will of the people with mental disabilities? The paradigm shift on which 
the CRPD insists assumes the true desire to create an adequate social environment in which 
everyone, regardless of the existence or absence of disabilities, will be able to achieve full and 
68  Ibid. p. 58. 
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free development and realize their full potential. Due to the ratification of the CRPD and the 
adoption of new legislation, the status of these persons will not improve if they are not backed 
up by appropriate transformations of political processes.69 Such transformation should cre-
ate an environment where the rights of the person with disabilities are seen as “the primary 
departure point and not as an annoying distraction.”70 This should be a solid foundation on 
which a new system should be built, but for which there is still no established practice and sci-
entific research is lacking. Therefore, its establishment necessarily presupposes a certain dose 
of courage and risk taking.71 But, we should not be afraid; we should simply try to understand.
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XXI. STOLJEĆE – POČETAK NOVE 
ERE U ZAŠTITI LJUDSKIH PRAVA OSOBA S DUŠEVNIM SMETNJAMA
Sažetak
U radu se analizira odredba čl. 12. Konvencije o pravima osoba s invaliditetom te njezin utje-
caj na položaj osoba s duševnim smetnjama. Nova koncepcija poslovne sposobnosti sadržana 
u čl. 12. trebala bi osigurati da temeljna ljudska prava osoba s duševnim smetnjama više ne 
budu mrtvo slovo na papiru. No, nakon što je Konvencija stupila na snagu, implementacija 
ove odredbe pokazala se problematičnom za države stranke. O razmjerima problema najbolje 
govori izjava Diane Kingston, bivše potpredsjednice Odbora za prava osoba s invaliditetom, iz 
listopada 2015., kako dotad nijedna zemlja nije u potpunosti udovoljila zahtjevima sadržani-
ma u čl. 12. S obzirom na to da je Konvencija dokument koji propisuje temeljna ljudska prava, 
izjava kako nijedno nacionalno zakonodavstvo nije usklađeno s njegovom ključnom odredbom 
zbunjujuća je i zabrinjavajuća te zahtijeva da se odredbi čl. 12. posveti posebna pozornost.
Ključne riječi:   Konvencija o pravima osoba s invaliditetom, osobe s duševnim smetnjama, ljudska 
prava, poslovna sposobnost, sposobnost odlučivanja, potpomognuto odlučivanje
*  Dr. sc. Marissabell Škorić, izvanredna profesorica, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Hahlić 6, 51000 Rijeka, Republika 
Hrvatska. Adresa e-pošte: skoric@pravri.hr. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0627-3651.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
